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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent research in low income countries has shown high transactions 
costs for both lenders and borrowers in diverse rural financial markets 
(Adams and Nehman, Inter-American Development Bank, Nyanin, Pokharel, and 
z. Ahmed). These costs are higher than those found in financial 
intermediaries serving other sectors, in part because of the dispersed 
nature of agriculture. In the following discussion we argue that 
transactions costs are elevated because rural financial markets are 
performing poorly. We go on to argue that carefully measured transactions 
costs are a barometer of the overall efficiency of the financial system 
and are also proxies for how financial markets affect income and asset 
distributions. We use data collected in two regions of Sudan to illustrate 
our arguments. 
2. Background on Agricultural Credit in Sudan 
The Sudan is a large country that heavily depends on agriculture for 
earning foreign exchange (95%), providing a major part of its gross 
national product (40%), employing a majority of its population (70%), 
feeding its inhabitants, and supplying raw materials for its industries. 1 
The public sector is directly involved in a large part of irrigated 
1 The Democratic Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (MFEP), Third Three-Year Public Investment Programme 1982/83-
1984/85, Khartoum: MFEP, 1982. 
agriculture through ten public agricultural corporations (PACs). They are 
involved in a total gross area of more than 1.6 million irrigated hectares. 
PACs have absolute control over the production of cotton, castor oil, sugar 
cane, and wheat; and a good deal of control over sesame, ground nuts, gum 
Arabic, and sorghum. This control includes investment, pricing, 
management, production, and marketing. 
The government also influences both public and private agricultural 
activities through credit programs. The Bank of Sudan (Central Bank) and 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning fund the public agricultural 
corporations, while the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan (ABS), some 
commercial banks, and other financial institutions provide credit for 
private producers (Ahmed Humeida 1983). 
Table 1 shows the loans granted by the Bank of Sudan and the repayment 
performance of nine PACs for the 1980/81, 1981/82, and 1982/83 seasons. As 
can be noted, defaults on PAC loans were about 50% in each of these 
seasons. In July 1983 the total outstanding loans to these corporations 
was about US$ 111 million; 56% of the Central Bank's total advances. The 
sharp drop in the real value of loans to PACs over this period is also 
noteworthy in the Table. 
Nationalized commercial banks, the Cooperative Development Bank, the 
Sudanese Saving Bank, and a recently established Islamic Bank make a few 
loans to farmers, but concentrate mostly on import-export trade where the 
profit is quick and sure. Although frowned upon officially, informal 
"shell" merchants continue to be the primary sources of loans for most 
rural people (Awad 1973; and Ahmed Humeida 1975). The sheil system is 
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TABLE 1. NEW LOANS TO NINE PUBLIC 
AGRICULTURAL CORPORATIONS BY 
BANK OF SUDAN 1980/81 - 1982/83 
YEARS 
1980/81 1981/82 
Bank Loans (million US$) 131.4 84.8 
Loan Repayment (million US$} 63.9 42.8 
Loan Repayment (%) 48 50 







based on borrowing grains or inputs from merchants and repaying, often in 
kind, at harvest (S. Ahmed, and Wilmington). 
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) was established in 1958 and 
currently has 24 branches and a paid-up capital of US$ 12.5 million. It 
has been the primary source of formal agricultural credit to private 
producers in the country for the past three decades, but only three of its 
branches accept deposits. In addition to private producers, it provides 
loans to agricultural cooperatives, farmers' unions, and to individual 
farmers in government and semi-government agricultural schemes who can 
offer satisfactory collateral. As can be noted in Table 2, the ABS is also 
facing serious loan recovery problems. Up to December 1984 the amount of 
loans in arrears was more than 36% of the total loan balances. This amount 
increases to more than 50% in some regions and to more than 90% in some 
branches. The aging-of-arrears information in Table 2 shows that loan 
defaults have been a chronic problem for ABS. 
The ABS has had an erratic pattern in the nominal value of its new 
agricultural loans. In real terms, the value of new loans made by ABS has 
dropped sharply since 1975 to less than US$ 50 million in 1984. Also, the 
ABS has increasingly directed its funds into short-term credits (80% of the 
total volume of loans), and to trade activities (50% of its loans). With 
its limited resources, the bank was not able to cover more than 10% of its 
potential private borrowers. The Bank's capital is deteriorating due to 
the persistent problems in recovering loans, and capital erosion due to 
inflation. The problem of loan recovery has worsened the past several 
years due to adverse weather, civil war, and the economic stress that 
farmers in the Sudan have experienced. 
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TABLE 2. AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SUDAN, 
LOANS OUTSTANDING, AMOUNT IN 
ARREARS AND AGING-OF-ARREARS, 
DECEMBER 31, 1984 
Total Amount 
Outstanding in Aging-of-Arrears by No. of Years 
Regions Loan Arrears 0-1 1-3 3-5 5+ 
Million US$ % 
North and East 11.6 2.1 31 10 36 23 
Central 18.9 5.6 23 40 9 28 
West and South 17.9 9.7 16 39 32 13 
Total 48.3 17.4 20 36 25 19 
Source: Checchi and Company, unpublished Consultant Team Report prepared 
for the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 1985. 
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By most measures the ABS is having a difficult time supporting 
agricultural development. The ABS's poor performance is shown in its 
erratic supply of new agricultural loans, by its weak loan recovery, and by 
the shortening of the term structure of its loans. Because the ABS 
mobilizes few savings deposits, its flow of loanable funds is dependent on 
loan recoveries and on irregular insertions of external funds from the 
government and from donors. The substantial costs incurred by both the 
bank and its borrowers are proxy measures of ABS's weak support of 
agricultural development. 
Information on these transaction costs were collected during the latter 
part of 1979 through field interviews in two regions of Sudan, representing 
dry and traditional farming, and irrigated and modern agriculture. Branch 
offices of the ABS were located in each of these areas: the Drilling 
Branches and the Wad Medani. Estimates of ABS's costs are based on 
information drawn from these two branches, plus information provided by the 
head office in Khartoum. Data on borrower's costs of acquiring loans came 
from interviews with 60 farmers who had obtained loans from ABS in the two 
areas. From these borrowers, representative case studies were done 
clarifying the steps farmers must take to acquire loans. Because of the 
standard procedures used by the ABS in making loans, these case studies are 
quite representative of what most farmers face in doing business with the 
ABS (see Ahmed 1980 for more details on this study). 
3. BORROWING COSTS 
Until recently, researchers and policymakers paid little attention to 
non-interest costs of borrowing. Recent research has shown these costs can 
be relatively large, especially for customers who are non-preferred: new 
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borrowers, borrowers with weak collateral, borrowers who want relatively 
small loans, and individuals who have unstable incomes. Several authors 
have concluded that interest rate controls, other government regulations, 
and donor reporting requirements affect the magnitude and allocation of 
these costs among participants in financial markets (Cuevas and Graham, 
Gonzalez-Vega, and Ladman). It has also been argued that concessionary 
interest rates and other regulations encourage intermediaries to transfer 
some of their normal loan transaction costs to non-preferred borrowers as a 
way of rationing cheap credit. 
Table 3 shows the various steps that a typical borrower from the Wad 
Medani Branch of the ABS took in getting a medium-term, medium-sized loan 
at the concessionary rate of 9 percent per year. The case-study farmer 
lives about 60 miles from the branch office, borrowed the equivalent of 
US$ 3,552 for four years to buy and install a water pump, to establish an 
orchard, and to produce a small amount of fodder crop. He repaid his loan 
on time. His total loan transaction cost amounted to about US$ 500, equal 
to about two-thirds of his total interest payment. Almost 70 percent of 
the farmer's transactions costs were due to transportation expenses, and 
his opportunity cost of 15 days spent processing the loan and providing 
secure collateral for the lender. On an annual basis his total effective 
costs of borrowing amounted to 16 percent. 
Using information gathered from other farmers it was possible to 
construct estimates of the transaction costs for borrowers with other 
characteristics. Table 4 summarizes this information for three sizes of 
loans (small, medium, and large), and for two types of borrowers (new and 
experienced borrowers). To simplify the analysis we focus only on loans 
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TABLE 3. STEPS IN BORROWING A MEDIUM-SIZED LOAN FROM THE WAD 




Certificate estimating the 
value of the collateral 
Water pump performance invoice 
Cost estimation to establish 
an orchard 
Cost estimation on building 
for a water pump 
Sketch map of the site 
Rental contract 
Registration of the collateral 
An approval to withdraw water 
from the Blue Nile 
Income certificate 
Agricultural report 
Summary of loan application 
Insurance of water pump for 4 years 
Stamps and stamp duties 
Collateral redemption 
Cost of transportation to-excute 
or follow up above items 
Meals and miscellaneous expenses 
Cost of one trip to Khartoum 
Two trips to get the loans and four 
to repay 
Authority Involved 
The Wad Medani Branch of the ABS 
Local authority at capital city 
Private architect 
Private dealer 
Horticultural department at 
capital city 
Private architect 
Private civil engineer 
Local authority at capital city 
Local authority at capital city 
Ministry of Irrigation at 
capital city 
Prepared by client with the help 
of a loan officer 
Written by branch agriculturalist 
after visiting the site 
Prepared by loan officer 
Private insurance company 
Post Office 
Local authority at capital city 
(Twenty trips) 
Loan authorization of headquarters 
Source: Survey results from interviews in Wad Medani, 1979. 
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with a duration of four years. All borrowers paid 9 percent interest on 
their loans. As can be noted in the Table, new borrowers incurred more 
transactions costs per unit of money obtained, and thus the effective 
borrowing rate varied directly with the loan size. Experienced borrowers 
with large loans paid an effective borrowing rate of 12 percent for their 
loans, while inexperienced small borrowers paid 30 percent. Since many of 
the initial costs of getting loans from the ABS are fixed, regardless of 
size or term, new borrowers wanting small loans for only one cropping 
season incur effective borrowing costs that are much higher than the 30 
percent shown in Table 4. Their rates are similar to the so called 
exorbitant rates charged by informal lenders. 
The substantial initial transactions costs incurred by borrowers also 
help clarify why farmers have incentives to postpone repaying their loans. 
Since ABS applies very low penalty interest against those who repay loans 
late, borrowers who postpone their repayment for several years are able to 
lower their annual effective borrowing costs for the loan. The information 
in Table 5 summarizes estimates of the effective borrowing cost rates for 
those who repay their loans on time, those who postpone repaying for a 
year, for two years, and for three years. As can be noted, medium-sized 
and new borrowers can reduce their effective borrowing costs from 16% per 
year to 12% per year by repaying the loan three years late. 
While far from being the only reason for late loan repayment, spreading 
the borrower's loan transactions costs over a longer period of time than is 
specified in the loan contract is clearly an important way for borrowers to 
offset high loan transaction costs. It is especially rational behavior if 
borrowers are uncertain about their ability to get new loans in the near 
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TABLE 4. COSTS OF BORROWING FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS 
Interest Total 
Type Size of Paid Trans- Total Effective 
of Loan to the action Borrowing Borrowing 
Borrower in US$ ABS US$ Cost US$ Cost US$ Rate % 
Small and new 1,400 320 464 784 30 
S11all and experienced 1,400 320 438 758 28 
Mediu11 and new 3,540 798 506 1,304 16 
Mediu11 and 
Experienced 3,540 798 404 1,202 15 
Large and new 7,080 1,594 576 2,170 13 
Large and experienced 7,080 1,594 370 1,964 12 
Source: Survey results fro• interviews in the Wad Medani, 1979. 
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TABLE 5. EFFECTIVE LOAN RATES PAID BY DIFFERENT TYPES 
OF BORROWERS FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS OF TIME 
Effective Borrowing Costs in Percentage 
Loan Loan 
Loan Rescheduled Loan Rescheduled 
Type Repaid as for one Rescheduled for 
of Scheduled More for Three 
Borrower in 4 years Year Two Years Years 
Small New 30 24 18 18 
Small Experienced 28 22 17 17 
Medium-Sized New 16 14 13 12 
Medium-Sized Experienced 15 13 12 12 
Large and New 13 13 11 10 
Large and Experienced 12 12 10 9 
Source: Survey results from interviews in Wad Medani, 1979 
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future, even if loans are repaid on time. The irony of this is that 
lenders increase the incentives to default by being overly careful in 
extending loans and increasing borrower's loan transactions costs. 
4. LENDING COSTS 
With its cumbersome lending procedures the ABS is inadvertently 
transferring part of its normal loan transaction costs to at least some of 
its non-preferred borrowers. As a result, one might expect that ABS would 
have relatively low costs of transacting loans. A careful analysis of the 
actual costs of lending in two branches of the ABS showed this was not the 
case. In Table 6, cost information is presented for the Wad Medani Branch 
for representative years over the period 1965 to 1977. Using conservative 
assumptions, the accounting costs of lending for the branch ran from a low 
of 11 percent in 1968 to a high of 34 percent in 1965. The average 
accounting cost for the five years studied was 17 percent, almost double 
the roughly 9 percent that the ABS charged on most of its loans during this 
period. Similar figures for the Drilling Branch showed even higher 
accounting lending costs ranging from 19 percent in 1971 to 43 percent in 
1974 (see Table 7). 
When a realistic risk premium for loan default is added, a realistic 
cost of funds is applied to money lent, and an adjustment is made to 
reflect overall price changes in the economy, the real costs of lending are 
much higher. In the Wad Medani branch this rate was as high as 68 percent 
in 1971. An even higher rate of 84 percent was calculated for the Drilling 
Branch in 1974 (see Tables 6 and 7). Clearly, under any reasonable set of 
assumptions, it has been very costly for the ABS to extend loans. 
Likewise, it is very costly for most of the new borrowers seeking small 
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TABLE 6. ACCOUNTING AND TRUE LENDING COSTS FOR THE ABS, 
WAD MEDANI BRANCH, 1965-1977 
Costs 1965 1971 1977 
Total Branch Administrative Costs US$ 12,568 24,455 55,540 
Total Value of Loans US$ 55,144 227,976 2,659,888 
A. 
1. Branch Administrative Cost % 
2. Headquarters Administrative Cost % 
3. Risk Premium Allocation % 
4. Actual Cost of Funds % 
Accounting Lending Cost % 
B. 
3a. Actual Default Rate % 
4a. Opportunity Cost of Funds in % 
(Market Rate) 
True Lending Cost in % 








































TABLE 7. ACCOUNTING AND TRUE LENDING COSTS FOR THE ABS, 
DRILLING BRANCH, 1971-1977 
Costs 1971 1974 
Branch Administrative Cost US$ 6,495 29,771 
1977 
68,060 
Branch Loans US $ 350,352 117' 059 740,860 
Branch Administrative Costs % 2 25 9 
Headquarters Administrative Costs % 6 8 7 
Risk Premium Allocation % 8 7 1 
Actual Cost of Funds-% 3 3 3 
Accounting Lending Cost % 19 43 20 
Actual Defaults % 22 18 10 
Market rate % 7 7 10 
True Lending Cost % 37 58 36 
Price Change % 2 26 17 
Total % 39 84 53 
Source: Unpublished records, Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Drilling Branch, 
1971-1977. 
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loans to get formal loans. It is little wonder that many of the farmers in 
the Sudan find informal lenders, who impose very few loan transactions 
costs on their borrowers, more attractive to use than the official sources 
of credit. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
It is useful to compare the joint transaction costs that lenders and 
borrowers incur in carrying out financial intermediation with the friction 
engineers worry about in engines. If an engine is poorly designed, badly 
balanced, or does not receive adequate lubrication, it will run with a good 
deal of friction and heat. The greater the friction, the less efficient 
the engine. The excessive transactions costs found in rural financial 
markets in countries such as the Sudan are a concrete indication of the 
amount of friction that exists in these systems and are also a concise 
measure of the efficiency with which the system is working. These costs 
are relatively easy to measure, and a diagnosis of their roots provides 
powerful insights into how to improve the overall efficiency of these 
markets. Traditionally, if policymakers wanted to know how well a credit 
program was working, they usually ask for measures of the impact of the 
program at the borrower level in terms of how many more modern inputs were 
used, and how much more product was produced. Credit impact is very 
difficult and extremely costly to measure in agriculture. It seems to us 
that policymakers would have more useful measures of how credit programs 
are working by looking at the costs these programs impose on participants 
in the intermediation process. 
Why are the transactions costs for borrowers and lenders so high in the 
ABS? Unfortunately, there has not been enough careful work done on this 
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question in Sudan to provide firm answers. Research in other low income 
countries suggests some possible answers, however. 
Clearly, the ABS is finding it difficult to sustain and expand its 
volume of lending to realize economies of scale. This is due to at least 
four major factors. First, government policies, plus the vagaries of 
nature, provide many farmers in the Sudan with low incomes, uncertain 
capacities to repay loans, and few highly profitable investment 
alternatives. This severely limits the volume of loans creditworthy 
farmers seek from the ABS. Second, poor loan recovery performance limits 
the amount of funds that ABS can recycle into new loans. Third, the very 
large negative spread between what ABS charges borrowers in terms of 
interest on loans, and what it costs ABS to provide these loans means that 
ABS continually must eat into its pool of loanable funds to cover its costs 
of operation. This, combined with inflation that generally exceeds ASS's 
nominal rate of interest on loans, means that the nominal and real value of 
its pool of loanable funds is substantially eroded each year. The ABS is 
far from being self sustaining and must constantly receive new funds from 
donors or the government to keep its doors open. In the broadest sense, 
the ABS is a retail outlet for outside funds, rather than being a self-
sustaining financial intermediary. Fourth, ABS mobilizes few voluntary 
deposits. This means that it must always look for outside funds that 
usually carry cumbersome reporting requirements, or political strings. 
Both of these factors result in substantial increases in the operating 
costs of the ABS. 
Why do many ABS borrowers incur large transactions costs? Any lender 
that has excess demand for concessionary priced funds will always try to 
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discourage non-preferred borrowers from asking for loans by requiring them 
to go through cumbersome steps. It is not in the interest of the lender to 
streamline procedures to reduce the non-preferred borrower's loan 
transaction costs. In fact, where possible, a rational lender will also 
shift many of its costs of effecting the loan to the non-preferred 
borrower. This will be especially true where the lender is on shaky 
financial ground and is experiencing hefty loan transaction costs. Without 
a large increase in the volume of funds available for lending, or a 
substantial increase in the rates of interest charged on loans so that loan 
prices discourage preferred borrowers from taking excessive amounts of 
loans, lenders such as ABS have little or no incentive to innovate and 
reduce the loan transaction costs they impose on non-preferred borrowers. 
While loans cannot lead rural development, an efficient rural financial 
market can play an important role in supporting technological change, 
facilitating investments, allowing a more efficient allocation of resources 
in rural areas, and providing attractive savings alternatives for those 
with excess funds. A financial system, such as that found in the Sudan, 
that is severely repressed through rigid interest rate controls largely 
fails to perform these important functions, and also has an adverse impact 
on the distribution of income and assets. A repressed financial market 
does not offer attractive savings opportunities in rural areas, and this is 
much more detrimental to the poor than it is to the rich. Also, a 
repressed financial market ends up concentrating most of the concessionary 
priced loans in the hands of the non-poor. Those with low incomes who do 
get formal loans find that their borrowing costs associated with these 
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loans far exceed the effective borrowing costs of the rich, even though the 
nominal interest rates charged on the loans may be identical. 
Interest rate policies in Sudan are a major factor causing the 
excessive transaction costs in financial markets, causing atrophy in the 
ABS, and resulting in very limited and very costly formal financial 
services for the rural poor. It will be very difficult for the ABS to 
become self-sustaining and to make larger contributions to agricultural 
development without major changes in current policies. We feel that 
reductions in transactions costs for both lenders and borrowers should be 
used as the principal indication of how well financial markets are working 
in the Sudan as well as elsewhere. 
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